Expenses, Notices, Interpretation, Headings, Severability, etc
What is all this? These are the standard, “boilerplate” terms that appear in almost all contracts. They are focused on addressing legal issues and don’t typically change the value of the deal for the parties.
The Middle Ground: Most of these terms are procedural or technical and use standard language. Thus, there is generally no need for the parties themselves to evaluate the terms; the lawyers on each side will look them over and report back if there are any issues worthy of discussion. The two clauses that are worth a second look here are the Specific Performance provision and the Venue provision.
The Specific Performance provision can be used by one party to force the other party to comply with the terms of the Agreement instead of paying monetary damages following a breach. Due to its practical implications, the parties will want to carefully assess whether they want to provide the other side with the power to require specific performance.
The Venue provision only plays a role if one party initiates litigation against the other, but when that happens the term dictates where the litigation will occur. If the parties reside in different states, the provision creates a sizable disparity in terms of costs to pursue the litigation in favor the side with the home state advantage.
Purpose: These are standard terms that are included in the Agreement due to concerns arising out of contract law rather than the specific needs of the parties. If all goes as planned, most of them will never even come into play. Generally, these terms can be seen as setting the ground rules for the administration and interpretation of the Agreement and for the handling of any disputes that may arise out of the Agreement.
Buyer and Seller Preference: These provisions are drafted to be equally applicable to both parties, so without knowing the context of the particular transaction it is difficult to point to any specific changes that either party might want to make to the standard terms. The one thematic area where it can safely be said that the parties’ interests will diverge is with regard to locational provisions, such as choosing which state’s law governs the Agreement and where claims can be brought (unless both parties reside in the same state). For those terms and many of the others in this section, the content preferences will likely depend on the personalities of the parties (e.g. which side is more likely to sue) and the dynamics created by the Agreement (e.g. which side is more likely to have to give notice).
Differences in a Stock Sale Transaction Structure: None.
Termination and Effect of Termination
What is the Termination and Effect of Termination section? These two clauses describe when either party (or both) can terminate the Agreement without breaching it and the effect termination would have on their respective covenants and obligations contained in the Agreement.
The Middle Ground: The Termination section allows for termination of the Agreement based on: (1) mutual consent of the parties; (2) only one party being in breach of the Agreement, if the other party sends written notice of the breach and it is not cured within ten days; (3) if one party will not be able to fulfill their Conditions to Closing, and such failure is not the fault of the other party; or (4) the existence or issuance of a Law or Governmental Order prohibiting the transaction. The Effect of Termination section makes clear that, once termination occurs, the Agreement is void and no party is liable to the other except that the Termination and Miscellaneous Articles survive termination, as does the Confidentiality provision, and the parties remain on the hook for any willful violation of any provision of the Agreement.
Purpose: In conjunction with other clauses throughout the Agreement, the Termination provision provides both parties with the opportunity to walk away from the deal without penalty under certain circumstances. By making it easier to walk away, the provision encourages the parties to be on their best behavior. The result is that the transaction is actually more likely to be completed.
Without the Effect of Termination clause, the prospect of abandoning the transaction prior to the Closing would be a difficult decision given concerns regarding confidentiality and the information provided to the other side during due diligence. Furthermore, if claims for willful breach of the Agreement died along with the Agreement, the mere proposal of mutual termination would be grounds for suspicion of bad behavior, and termination by mutual consent would likely only occur when the relationship between the parties is broken beyond repair.
In other words, the termination provisions set the bar for walking away from the transaction at just the right height; the bar is not so high that the parties are forced into completing a bad deal, and not so low that committing significant time and money to the due diligence process simply isn’t worth the risk of the other party walking away on a whim.
Buyer Preference: If there are any specific facts or circumstances that are not encompassed by the middle ground term and would make the Buyer want to terminate the Agreement, the Buyer can include them as grounds for termination. Also, if the Buyer must obtain financing for the transaction and there is no “financing out” in the Agreement, the Buyer may want to include a provision allowing it to pay a reasonable “reverse break-up fee” to walk away from the transaction. If a reverse break-up fee is included, the Buyer may seek to include a traditional break-up fee to be paid by the Seller if it is the one who walks away from the deal. The Buyer may also want to expand the claims that would survive termination to include any breaches of the Agreement whatsoever and any fraud or intentional misrepresentations.
Seller Preference: Because the Seller’s representations and warranties are so much more expansive than those of the Buyer, the Seller does not want to extend the Effect of Termination provision to cover any breach of the Agreement. However, it does want to be able to recover for any willful breaches by the Buyer, so the Seller will typically be content with the grounds for termination provided by the middle ground term. Additionally, while the Buyer prefers a financing out and, in its absence, a nominal reverse break-up fee, the Seller prefers no financing out and a significant reverse break-up fee to compensate it for the time and expense associated with the due diligence process. However, if the Seller insists on a reverse break-up fee it can expect the Buyer to demand a similar fee to be applied if the Seller refuses to close the transaction.
Differences in a Stock Sale Transaction Structure: None.
Exclusive Remedies
What are Exclusive Remedies? Buyers and sellers usually spend significant time agreeing on an indemnification scheme, so they tend to want most claims for breaches of the Agreement to be governed by indemnification. This section identifies the claims that must be pursued through indemnification and those that are exempt from that limitation.
The Middle Ground: Subject to the equitable remedies provided for in the Agreement, this provision limits the parties’ available remedies in the event one of them breaches the Agreement, except for situations involving fraud, criminal activity, or intentional misconduct. More specifically, if a breach occurs that is not due to one of the three listed exceptions and for which an equitable remedy is not available, the non-breaching party’s only option is to make an indemnification claim (if the parties have chosen to make all covenants and other terms subject to indemnification in addition to the representations and warranties).
Purpose: This restriction is intended to limit the parties’ risk by making indemnification the sole avenue for resolving most claims related to the Agreement. In fact, this term is necessary if indemnification is intended to be the Agreement’s main enforcement mechanism, because without it the parties could simply bypass the indemnification process by filing a lawsuit.
Buyer Preference: Being a fairly standard provision, most buyers accept it as part of the Agreement and, consequently, spend a considerable amount of time negotiating their indemnification rights. However, more aggressive buyers may argue for an alternate provision that allows for indemnification in addition to the usual legal and equitable remedies.
Seller Preference: The Seller wants the exceptions included in this provision to be as narrow as possible since it is typically the party against whom a complaint is being made. In particular, the definition of fraud varies from state to state and may not be as limiting as the Seller intends it to be. To prevent an unwelcome surprise, the Seller (and/or its attorney) must be aware of the legal bounds of fraud, criminal activity, and intentional misconduct in the state whose law governs the Agreement.
Differences in a Stock Sale Transaction Structure: None.
Effect of Investigation
What is the Effect of Investigation section? The Buyer and Seller may view the role and consequences of due diligence differently, so this section is used clarify how knowledge gained during due diligence affects the parties’ rights under the Agreement.
The Middle Ground: This clause states that the parties’ indemnification rights are not affected by its pre-Closing knowledge (or that of its Representatives) or by the waiver of any of the Conditions to Closing. It is often referred to as a “sandbagging” provision because the non-breaching party can claim indemnification after Closing even if it knew or should have known prior to Closing that a representation or warranty was inaccurate.
Purpose: This provision is included to fortify the parties’ indemnification rights in situations where one party knew or should have known prior to the Closing that one or more of the other party’s representations was false. Because the Buyer is typically the one conducting an investigation and gathering information, it is most helpful to the Buyer. It lessens the Buyer’s transaction risk, helps it protect the value it receives from the deal, and makes for a much quicker transaction process for both sides.
Without this provision, the Buyer would need to either (i) investigate every time a Seller’s statement doesn’t match up to the Buyer’s information and make an indemnification claim before the deal is even done, or (ii) complete no investigation whatsoever. Both of those options are detrimental to the Buyer and may cause headaches for the Seller (or blow up the deal), so most parties will turn to this provision to allow the Buyer to conduct a thorough but measured due diligence investigation.
Buyer Preference: Because knowledge of a breach may not equate to knowledge of its consequences, and because it is the Seller’s duty to provide accurate representations, most buyers insist that a sandbagging provision be included in the Agreement. The Buyer wants to include this provision even in states that, as a default rule, allow for sandbagging. State statutes may require the Buyer to prove additional elements beyond the falsity of the representation or warranty, so including the provision in the Agreement simplifies the process for making an indemnification claim.
Seller Preference: The Seller will likely try to exclude this provision or add an anti-sandbagging provision that explicitly removes the Buyer’s indemnification rights if it has knowledge of the breach prior to Closing. Alternatively, if the Seller learns that the Buyer knows of a breach prior to the Closing, the Seller may seek to obtain a waiver from the Buyer for that specific breach rather than fighting to have the entire sandbagging provision thrown out. In terms of time allocation, most sellers will prefer to spend time making sure their representations are accurate rather than using up time and negotiating leverage to avoid the cost of a misrepresentation (and buyers will prefer that too, making for a smoother negotiation).
Differences in a Stock Sale Transaction Structure: None.
Indemnification Procedures
What are Indemnification Procedures? While previous indemnification-related sections focus on the circumstances under which a claim can be made, this section details the procedural rights and requirements of both sides once a claim is made. Essentially, it provides the rules that must be followed once the indemnification process has been initiated.
The Middle Ground: The Indemnifying Party’s rights typically include (but are not limited to) receiving prompt notice of the claim and its details, the right to assume and control the defense of the claim (except in a few limited circumstances), and the right to the Indemnified Party’s cooperation in investigating claims. The Indemnified Party’s rights usually include controlling legal proceedings when the Indemnified Party is the Buyer and the claim is brought by a customer or supplier of the Business or when an equitable remedy is sought, as well as participating in the defense of claims when such defense is controlled by the Indemnifying Party.
Purpose: Indemnification is an essential tool used to enforce the terms of the Agreement, and this section lays out the steps that must be taken and the rights of each party involved when an indemnification claim is made. It has a moderate impact on risk for both parties (more so for the Seller, who is typically the Indemnifying Party), yet its main purpose is to give effect to more substantive indemnification provisions. It is important for the parties to strike the right balance between implementing enough procedures and rules to allow the Indemnifying Party to mitigate its risk as much as possible, while not employing so many hurdles that they interfere with the Indemnified Party’s ability to actually receive indemnification.
Buyer Preference: The Buyer generally favors terms that benefit the Indemnified Party such as including a specific but generous notice period, allowing the Indemnified Party to control all claims against it once the Cap is met (if a Cap is included), and giving the Indemnified Party the option whether to control defense of all claims. The Indemnified Party may also want a say over who the Indemnifying Party enlists as counsel to defend against a claim and/or the ability to control the defense when the Indemnified Party has defenses available to it that are not available to the Indemnified Party.
Seller Preference: The Seller’s preferences will usually be those of the Indemnifying Party. Those preferences typically include the desire for a flexible notice standard (e.g. “reasonably prompt notice”) and the ability to control the defense of all third-party claims and settlements. The Seller may also want to insert an arbitration provision so that disputes over direct claims can be resolved quickly and less expensively than would be the case with litigation.
Differences in a Stock Sale Transaction Structure: If the Stock Purchase Agreement contains a tax-specific indemnification provision tax issues will need to be carved out of this section so there is no question they are governed solely by the tax indemnification provisions.
Certain Limitations
What is the Certain Limitations section? If no limits are set on the right to indemnification it is a tool that can be abused by the parties, especially in situations where there is not a working relationship between the Buyer and Seller after the Closing. Here, the parties implement boundaries around indemnification to avoid the problems caused by abuse of indemnification rights.
The Middle Ground: This provision limits the indemnification claims that can be brought by setting “Caps” and “Baskets” around the right to indemnification. A Basket sets a minimum amount of damages that must be incurred before an indemnification claim can be brought, and it is typically limited to claims based on breaches of the representations and warranties in the Agreement. Typically, the Basket sets a minimum threshold for making a claim and once that threshold is reached the injured party is eligible to receive 100% of the damages it suffered. A Cap may also be included, and it serves as an upper limit on the amount that will be paid in the event of a claim or the aggregate amount that will be paid out for all indemnification claims of a party.
Purpose: The purpose of a Basket is to prevent one party from trying to recapture some of the value given up in the deal by making numerous “nickel and dime” claims against the other side. In other words, it prevents the parties from abusing their indemnification rights. By doing so, the provision protects the parties’ expectations regarding their risk exposure and the value received from the transaction. Caps are also used as a tool to manage overall risk exposure, and they are especially important in situations where there is a reasonable potential for one of the parties to make a large indemnification claim. In addition to their risk management function, Caps and Baskets also increase the chances that the transaction will be completed by encouraging the parties to provide expansive indemnification rights since they know those rights are not subject to abuse and will not create unlimited liability.
Buyer Preference: The Buyer is the party most likely to bring an indemnification claim, which has a number of implications for how it wants to structure this provision. At the most basic level, it wants the Basket to be small (to allow for the payment of moderate claims) and the Cap to either be large or nonexistent. It may also want to tailor the Cap to its specific concerns; if the potential Losses based on one representation are much greater than for the other representations, the Buyer may be better off negotiating for a significantly higher Cap (or no Cap at all) in that area and a smaller Cap in the other areas than for a moderate Cap applicable to every representation. It certainly wants no Cap regarding any liabilities kept by the Seller, as it has no control over those liabilities. It also wants to carve out certain fundamental representations from the Basket and Cap, such as the Organization and Authority representations.
The Buyer wants to resist additional limitations on indemnification payouts, such as a Duty to Mitigate or a requirement to subtract from such payouts any tax or insurance amounts. However, when a Basket is included in the Agreement the Buyer is more likely to seek a “materiality scrape,” which is a provision that removes any materiality qualifiers from the representations and warranties for indemnification purposes. When a materiality scrape is used, the materiality qualifiers used in the representations and warranties still apply to limit what the Seller must disclose in the Agreement, but they do not apply for purposes of determining whether an indemnification claim can be brought and what the damages for the claim will be. The reasoning underlying the use of a materiality scrape in this context is that the Basket already screens out any non-material claims, so including an additional materiality requirement will likely complicate the indemnification process and lead to needless disputes.
Seller Preference: Since the Seller is going to be paying out an indemnification claim in most cases, it will typically seek a high Basket and a low Cap. In addition to this basic position, the Seller will also prefer a “deductible” Basket rather than a “dollar one” or “tipping” Basket. The distinguishing factor about deductible Baskets is that the Basket amount is more than just a threshold, it is also the amount deducted from the total damages to determine the required payment. To put it another way, with a deductible Basket the side making the claim is only entitled to the amount of damages exceeding the Basket amount. In lieu of a deductible Basket, the parties could settle on a hybrid approach, in which the amount deducted from the payout is less than the threshold amount but more than zero. Another beneficial option for the Seller is to include one or more “mini-baskets” that require damages from a particular representation to reach a certain amount before they are counted toward the overall Basket.
Over and above changing how the Basket functions, the Seller could also try to have the Basket apply to all representations, warranties, covenants, and obligations contained in the Agreement, not just the selected representations and warranties. Similarly, the Seller can try to negotiate for the Cap to extend to all indemnification claims. If unsuccessful on that front, the Seller can argue that some Cap (e.g. the Purchase Price amount) should be placed on payments for breach of fundamental representations and warranties, as well as the remaining covenants and obligations in the Agreement, even if that Cap is higher than the Cap applied to the non-fundamental representations and warranties.
Furthermore, the Seller can avoid a “double recovery” situation by including language reducing any indemnification payments by the amount of any insurance money paid to the Buyer for the claim, and it can make the language more effective by requiring the Buyer to use its reasonable best efforts to pursue any viable insurance claim. Another way to avoid double recovery is to reduce the amount of any indemnification claims that result in a tax benefit to the Buyer by the amount of the tax benefit. For instance, if the Seller breaches a representation and the Loss from that breach causes the Business to sustain a net operating loss (NOL) for the year, the amount of the indemnification claim would be reduced by the tax value of the NOL. One final way to limit double recovery applies in situations where the Agreement allows for a Purchase Price Adjustment, and the goal is to ensure that any such adjustment is subtracted from the Losses payable based on an indemnification claim. The Seller could also seek to impose on the Buyer a “Duty to Mitigate,” meaning the indemnified party would be required to try to reduce its damages from a breach by taking some sort of corrective action.
Finally, if the Agreement contains an escrow provision, the Seller can negotiate for its money held in escrow to be paid out to satisfy a claim for indemnification before it is required to pay money out of its own pocket to do so.
Differences in a Stock Sale Transaction Structure: None.
Indemnification by Buyer
What is Indemnification by Buyer? Indemnification is used to enforce representations, warranties and covenants made in the Agreement. Here, the parties list out which breaches by the Buyer are subject to the Seller’s right to indemnification.
The Middle Ground: Much like the previous provision, this one requires the Buyer to indemnify the Seller, its Affiliates, and its Representatives for any Losses caused by an inaccuracy or breach of the Buyer’s representations, warranties, covenants, and other Buyer obligations that the parties agree will be covered by indemnification. The provision is meant to mirror the “Indemnification by Seller” section, with the only difference being the list of items for which indemnification is available.
Purpose: While the Buyer is usually the party most concerned with managing the risk that accompanies the transaction, there are significant areas of risk that the Seller has to deal with as well. Often, that risk is allocated to the Buyer through other pieces of the Agreement because the Buyer is in the best position to control it. This clause gives effect to the risk allocation agreed upon by the parties by providing the Seller with a relatively quick and simple method of recouping damages caused by a Buyer’s breach or misrepresentation.
Buyer Preference: Ideally, the Buyer wants this list to be as short as possible. In practice, the categories listed above will likely all be included because they all represent issues associated with potential liabilities, and they are the areas within the Buyer’s control. Furthermore, if there are any additional issues listed in the Seller’s indemnification section for which the Buyer has a reciprocal responsibility, the Buyer can expect for those issues to be included here since this provision is meant to mirror the Indemnification by Seller provision.
Seller Preference: The Seller wants the Buyer’s responsibilities to extend to any situation where the Seller could lose money due to the actions of the Buyer. For example, if the Seller leases a piece of land from a third party and the landowner requires the Buyer to sublease that land from the Seller rather than take it by assignment (perhaps because the landowner knows the Seller but not the Buyer), the Seller could end up being responsible for unpaid rent if the Buyer fails to live up to its obligations. Typically, the Buyer’s duty to pay rent will be established elsewhere in the Agreement, so it need not be listed separately here, but the Seller would want it listed here if not previously addressed.
Differences in a Stock Sale Transaction Structure: None.
Indemnification by Seller
What is Indemnification by Seller? Indemnification is used to enforce representations, warranties and covenants made in the Agreement. Here, the parties list out which breaches by the Seller are subject to the Buyer’s right to indemnification.
The Middle Ground: This provision requires the Seller to reimburse the Buyer, its Affiliates, and their Representatives for any Losses arising out of: (1) the inaccuracy or breach of any representation or warranty contained in the Agreement or other Transaction Documents, if the representation or warranty was inaccurate or breached when made or at the Closing; (2) non-fulfillment of any covenant, agreement, or obligation undertaken by the Seller pursuant to the transaction; (3) any of the Excluded Assets or Excluded Liabilities; and (4) any Third Party Claim resulting from the Seller’s (or its Affiliates) operation or handling of the Business or Assets prior to the Closing Date.
Purpose: The indemnification aspect of the Agreement is the most efficient tool available for motivating the parties to stand by their agreed-upon obligations. As such, it is the main way for the parties to enforce the risk allocation scheme created throughout the Agreement.
Buyer Preference: If the Buyer is particularly worried about exposure from certain liabilities, it can specifically include those liabilities in this section so there is no debate whether they fall under the Seller’s indemnification obligation. Examples of the liabilities the Buyer may want to specify include retained employee liabilities, product liability claims, environmental issues concerning any assets or property transferred as part of the deal, and noncompliance with any applicable bulk sales laws. The Buyer also wants to carefully evaluate the definitions of “Affiliates” and “Representatives” to ensure the terms cover all those who may have an indemnification claim against the Seller in the future.
Seller Preference: The Seller wants to limit the matters eligible for indemnification as much as possible. Particularly, the Seller will be looking out for issues it cannot control to avoid being held responsible for problems caused by third parties.
Differences in a Stock Sale Transaction Structure: In a stock sale, there are no Excluded Assets or Excluded Liabilities, so it is even more essential for the Buyer to specifically list the liabilities for which the Seller has indemnification obligations. An often-used alternative to including a specific list in this section is to address those concerns in the representations and warranties since they are incorporated here by reference.
Survival
What is the Survival section? This section allows the parties to use indemnification to resolve post-Closing disputes. But what is indemnification? In short, it is a built-in enforcement mechanism that allows the parties to be made whole following a breach of the Agreement without going through the costly and time-consuming legal system. Rather than enforcing the representations and warranties (and, potentially, other areas of the Agreement) through litigation, the parties agree that certain breaches will be handled between the parties without going to court. For example, if the Buyer breaches a portion of the Agreement that is subject to indemnification, the Seller calculates the damage suffered because of the breach and makes a claim to the Buyer for payment. The Buyer can accept the claim and make the payment, or object and it is resolved by an agreed upon dispute resolution process (one that is meant to be faster and cheaper than litigation).
The Middle Ground: The Survival provision states that the representations and warranties (and any other provisions) subject to indemnification under the Agreement will survive after the Closing, and provides an explanation of when each representation is no longer applicable. Typically, the general survival period is anywhere between one and two years, with certain specified representations lasting for a longer period of time. The portions of the Agreement that tend to last longer than the baseline survival period include representations regarding fundamental corporate matters (i.e. organization and authority of both parties), Title to Purchased Assets, the Condition and Sufficiency of Assets, Taxes, Environmental Matters, and Employment Matters.
Purpose: Since most purchase agreements terminate at the Closing, certain portions must be identified for “survival” in order to remain effective after Closing. The indemnification provisions are some of the most important to survive termination of the Agreement. Without this survival clause, any cause for indemnification would have to be discovered prior to Closing, and that is simply not a reasonable expectation, especially for the Buyer who won’t take control of the Business until after the Closing. So, the Survival section is used to show how long claims for indemnification are available and ensures that those claims can be made after the ownership transition has taken place.
Buyer Preference: Ideally, the Buyer would be able to negotiate for indefinite survival of all representations, warranties, and covenants made by the Seller. In practice, that’s probably not going to happen since the Seller does not want to perpetually plan for the possibility of a claim, and because some states do not allow for contractual extension of a statute of limitations. To address the second concern, the Buyer has a couple options: (1) it can negotiate to change the governing law provision to a state with a longer statute of limitations or to a state that allows for contractual extension of the statute of limitations, or (2) state explicitly in the Agreement that a claim for indemnification does not accrue until the wrongdoing is discovered or should have been discovered. In addition to these general strategies, the Buyer wants to assess which representations, covenants, etc. present the greatest loss potential down the road and negotiate for the extended survival of those provisions. For example, whether companies are properly collecting sales tax has arisen as a major issue for buyers of e-commerce businesses, so the Buyer in that situation wants the representation relating to sales tax to survive for as long as it could be exposed to pre-Closing sales tax liability.
Seller Preference: Other than the payment provisions that favor the Seller and extend past the Closing, the Seller will prefer a short survival period for the representations, warranties, and covenants contained in the Agreement. That is because, by the nature of the transaction, the Buyer is more likely to bring a claim for indemnification than the Seller. In some jurisdictions, simply limiting the survival period is not enough to prevent an indemnification claim during that period; the survival language must actually limit the time in which a claim can be brought for a breach. Unlike the Buyer, the Seller should have intimate knowledge of where its risk lies regarding the Purchased Assets, so its top priority on this point is to attempt to limit the survival periods in those areas.
Differences in a Stock Sale Transaction Structure: None.
Conditions to Obligations of Seller
What are the Conditions to Obligations of Seller? This provision contains a comprehensive list of requirements that must be completed by the Buyer or waived by the Seller in order for the Seller to be obligated to complete the purchase. If the Buyer fails to fulfill any condition included in the list, the Seller can walk away from the deal without penalty.
The Middle Ground: The main difference between this provision and the Conditions to Obligations of Buyer is that there aren’t as many conditions to the Seller’s obligations since its paramount concern in most instances is whether the Buyer can pay the Closing payment. With that said, the typical list of requirements in this provision includes conditions to be completed at (or before) Closing such as:
The Buyer’s representations and warranties are true and correct in all (material) respects at the time of signing the Agreement and at the Closing;
The Buyer has complied with all terms of the Agreement and the Transaction Documents in all material respects;
No Governmental Authority has issued an order or injunction restraining the transaction;
The Buyer has obtained all third-party consents listed in its Disclosure Schedules, if applicable to the transaction;
The Buyer has delivered signed copies of the Transaction Documents;
The Buyer has transferred the Closing payment by wire transfer and the amount to be held in escrow to the Escrow Agent, if applicable;
The Seller has received a signed copy of the Buyer Closing Certificate;
The Seller has received a signed copy of the Buyer’s Secretary’s Certificate; and
The Buyer has provided other documents and instruments reasonably requested by the Seller and that are reasonably necessary to consummate the transaction.
Purpose: If the Buyer does not meet any one of the conditions listed in this provision, the transaction could fall apart instantly. This provision places the risk of that happening on the Buyer. It’s important to note here that the risk allocation scheme created by this provision and the previous one is not unfair to either side; both are afforded the opportunity to walk away if the other side does not meet its obligations, and the obligations each must meet are the product of negotiation and, typically, within the control of the party who must meet them.
Buyer Preference: The Buyer wants as few conditions listed here as possible, with those listed being wholly within its control, if possible. Furthermore, the Buyer will want materiality qualifiers included, particularly relating to conditions (1), (2), (3), and (4). However, this is another area where the requirements applicable to the Buyer will largely mirror those of the Seller, so the Buyer will have to decide what level of accuracy it is comfortable promising regarding its own deliverables. One condition for which it makes sense to have some divergence between Buyer is Seller is the “litigation out” listed in condition (3). With that condition, the Buyer is rightfully worried about any litigation whatsoever affecting the Seller’s Business since the Buyer will undoubtedly be impacted by that litigation. Depending on the Seller’s post-transaction plans and the nature of the litigation, it may or may not be concerned with a lawsuit brought against the Buyer. In regard to the third-party consent condition, it may not be necessary for the Buyer to obtain any such consents, but if it is the Buyer will want the condition limited to those consents which are material to the transaction.
Seller Preference: Here, the Seller is looking for equality. In the Seller’s mind, whatever standards are applied in the Conditions to Obligations of Buyer section should also be applied here. For example, the Seller will want the Buyer’s representations and warranties qualified by materiality only to the same extent that its own are subject to those qualifications. More specifically, it will want any representations or warranties already qualified by a general materiality standard or a Material Adverse Effect standard to not be qualified by any such standard in this section. Going even further, it will not want the Buyer’s representations regarding its organization and authority to conduct the transaction to be subject to any materiality qualifier whatsoever.
While the Seller’s overall goal in this section is parity between the conditions applicable to the Buyer and the conditions that it must meet, to retain its negotiating credibility the Seller only wants to insist upon parity when it makes sense in the context of the transaction. By the nature of the deal, not every condition that the Seller must fulfill will need to be fulfilled by the Buyer. So, the Seller’s best approach is to be aware of its interests, have an understanding of the conditions necessary to meet those interests, and fight for the conditions that matter while not wasting resources on those that don’t.
Differences in a Stock Sale Transaction Structure: None.
Conditions to Obligations of Buyer
What are the Conditions to Obligations of Buyer? This provision contains a comprehensive list of requirements that must be completed by the Seller or waived by the Buyer in order for the Buyer to be obligated to complete the purchase. If the Seller fails to fulfill any condition included in the list, the Buyer can walk away from the deal without penalty.
The Middle Ground: Typically, the list states that:
(1) the Seller’s representations and warranties are true in all material respects at the time of the signing of the Agreement and the Closing;
(2) the Seller has complied with the Agreement and any other Transaction Documents in all material respects;
(3) no legal action has been taken that would prevent the transaction;
(4) all third-party approvals, consents, and waivers listed in the Disclosure Schedules relating to the Seller’s representations and warranties have been obtained;
(5) nothing has occurred that would constitute or cause a Material Adverse Effect;
(6) all Closing Deliverables and Transaction Documents have been signed by the Seller (as applicable) and delivered to the Buyer;
(7) the Buyer has received all Permits necessary to conduct the Business as conducted by the Seller;
(8) the Seller has provided the Buyer with title insurance and a Land Title Survey (or other appropriate deliverables) for each piece of Owned Real Property;
(9) written evidence has been provided to the Buyer that all Encumbrances, other than Permitted Encumbrances, have been released;
(10) the Buyer has received a signed copy of the Seller Closing Certificate;
(11) the Buyer has received a signed copy of the Seller’s Secretary’s Certificate;
(12) the Buyer has received a FIRPTA Certificate relating to the Business; and
(13) the Seller has delivered any other documents or instruments reasonably requested by the Buyer that are reasonably necessary to consummate the transaction.
Purpose: This provision provides numerous “outs” for the Buyer that create a relatively painless path out of the deal if the Seller does not meet its obligations, including some obligations that are relatively minor. The fact that the Buyer can walk away without penalty if a condition is not met means the risk of the Seller’s failure to deliver is shifted entirely to the Seller, who is obviously in a much better position to control that risk.
Buyer Preference: In addition to the conditions listed above, any number of requirements can be added to this section through negotiation among the parties. Common additional conditions sought by the Buyer include: (a) a “due diligence out” that allows the Buyer to walk away if it cannot complete due diligence to its satisfaction; (b) a “financing out” that conditions the Buyer’s obligation to close on it being able to obtain financing to fund the deal; and (c) financial or operating targets, such as sales or working capital, that, if not met, provide the Buyer with a way out of the deal. If the Seller operates in a highly-regulated industry, the Buyer may also require a legal opinion from the Seller’s legal counsel regarding the Business’s compliance with applicable laws. In addition to these general additional conditions, the Buyer also has certain preferences regarding the listed conditions, such as:
(1) The Buyer will likely include a materiality qualifier but will not want that qualifier to apply to any representation or warranty that already contains a materiality qualifier (i.e. the Buyer does not want a “double materiality” standard). Some exceptions for which the Buyer will want no materiality qualifier whatsoever include the representation regarding the organization and authority of the Seller, any monetary obligations, and financial statements. The Buyer will typically want this condition to Closing to be satisfied both at the time of signing the Agreement and at the Closing so that it can walk away if it receives materially inaccurate information at either time.
(2) Here, the Buyer once again wants to avoid a double materiality standard.
(3) The Buyer does not want any materiality qualifiers whatsoever in this “litigation out.” The Buyer will want to include any actions brought against it in addition to those brought against the Seller.
(4) The Buyer wants all third-party consents to be obtained as a condition to Closing, not just specifically-identified material consents.
(5) The Buyer may want to eliminate the Material Adverse Event condition altogether and replace it with specific event-based conditions, such as operational or financial benchmarks. Or, it may want to keep the Material Adverse Event condition and merely supplement it with specific benchmarks. In either case, the Buyer should be aware when selecting such benchmarks that financials usually lag behind operations and it is easier to manipulate the financial measurements than to inaccurately represent that an operational benchmark was met.
(8) To determine which conditions relating to real property need to be included here, the Buyer should consult a real estate attorney. If the transaction involves Leased Real Property, the Buyer will seek estoppel certificates from the landlord of the property.
(9) If the Buyer knows which documents are necessary to release Encumbrances associated with the Seller’s property, it will want to specify the documents and include a general statement like the one seen above to cover any documents needed but not listed. If the only way the Seller can have the Encumbrances released is to pay the creditor using the Closing payment, the Buyer will want to have the release documents placed in escrow until the creditor is paid.
Seller Preference: In general, the Seller wants to avoid allowing any conditions in this section that are not within its control, such as a due diligence out and a financing out. More specifically, the Seller will generally have the following preferences regarding the listed conditions:
(1) The Seller wants to go beyond a general materiality standard and require that, in order for the Buyer to walk away, a false representation or warranty must have a Material Adverse Effect on the Business. The Seller also wants this condition to apply only at the Closing so that it can cure any inaccuracies that exist when the Agreement is signed.
(3) The Seller wants to limit this condition to legal actions that are reasonably likely to succeed on the merits as a way of excluding frivolous claims that do not have any practical chance of preventing the transaction. Regarding any legal actions taken by a Governmental Authority, the Seller will want only those that prevent a material transaction contemplated by the Agreement to qualify as a litigation out for the Buyer.
(4) The Seller wants to limit this condition to specifically-identified material third-party consents, especially if there are a significant number of third-party consents to be obtained.
(5) Because it is difficult to prove that an event had a Material Adverse Effect on the Business, and because the burden is on the Buyer to prove a Material Adverse Effect, the Seller wants that standard to be applied here, rather than using specific financial or operational benchmarks. If the Buyer insists on specific benchmarks, the Seller will likely favor financial metrics over operational ones.
(8) The party customarily held responsible for paying survey and title insurance costs varies by jurisdiction, but regardless of convention the Seller will want the parties to split any costs related to these items (unless, of course, local custom says the Buyer pays).
Differences in a Stock Sale Transaction Structure: In a stock sale, the Buyer wants any representations and warranties relating to the shares of the Seller to be true and correct in all respects or, in other words, not subject to any sort of materiality qualifier. If the Buyer in a stock purchase is going to replace the directors and/or officers of the Business, receipt of their resignations should be included as a condition to the Buyer’s obligation to close. The Buyer in a stock purchase will also need a certificate of good standing for the Business from the appropriate Governmental Authority in the company’s state of organization.
Further Assurances
What are Further Assurances? Buying a business requires paying attention to many different areas of the business, and some steps that are needed to accomplish the transition from one owner to the next happen after the Closing Date. Rather than list out every single step within the Agreement (an exercise that would inevitably result in important steps being overlooked), both parties promise to take any reasonable actions that are required in order to carry out the terms of the Agreement.
The Middle Ground: This provision requires each party (and their respective Affiliates) to take any further actions following the Closing that are reasonably required to fulfill the Agreement and the other Transaction Documents.
Purpose: The covenant is included to address miscellaneous, post-Closing issues that are not explicitly covered elsewhere in the Agreement. It serves as a risk management tool for both sides and is meant to ensure that the actual outcome mirrors the bargained-for exchange.
Buyer Preference: None.
Seller Preference: None.
Differences in a Stock Sale Transaction Structure: None.
Tax Clearance Certificates
What are Tax Clearance Certificates? When a company is registered to conduct business in a particular state, the state keeps records of state-level taxes owed by the company. A tax clearance certificate is a document provided by the state indicating that the Business does not have any overdue taxes or, if taxes are owed, indicating the amount that the Business is required to pay.
The Middle Ground: This covenant requires the Seller to notify the taxing authorities (in jurisdictions that impose taxes on the Seller) of the transaction and to request tax clearance certificates from those taxing authorities where available. If the taxing authority indicates that the Seller is liable for unpaid taxes, the Seller must promptly pay those taxes and provide evidence of the payment to the Buyer.
Purpose: The goal of this provision is to prevent the Buyer from becoming liable for the Seller’s delinquent tax obligations. It plays a small role in risk allocation, but its importance is limited by the fact that the Buyer is indemnified for any such tax obligations. Thus, the covenant is most useful for the Buyer in situations where the Caps or Baskets on indemnification would preclude the Buyer from making a claim. With that said, indemnification can be tricky to negotiate and can involve a long claims process, so this covenant also serves to provide some peace of mind that state-level taxes will not cause problems for the Buyer.
Buyer Preference: The Buyer wants to include this covenant, especially if time is not an issue and including it would not place an undue burden on the Seller. The Buyer may even prefer to obtain the certificates itself rather than putting that task on the Seller’s plate. However, most buyers will not object to omitting it, especially if they can exclude tax-related claims from the limitations on indemnification.
Seller Preference: The Seller wants to exclude this covenant on the grounds that it unnecessarily adds more work to an already lengthy and exhaustive process. The Seller can point to the Buyer’s indemnification rights to show that the Buyer’s risk from delinquent taxes is already addressed elsewhere in the Agreement.
Differences in a Stock Sale Transaction Structure: This covenant is not included in stock sales. In the asset acquisition context, the covenant only requires the Seller to make notifications and requests of the relevant taxing authorities if the failure to do so would result in the Seller’s tax liability being transferred to the Buyer. Since that transfer is automatic in a stock sale, the Buyer relies on its indemnification rights to shield it from becoming responsible for the Seller’s unpaid taxes.
Transfer Taxes
What are Transfer Taxes? Some states tax certain aspects of a business acquisition, such as imposing taxes on the transfer of Owned Real Property. Here, the parties identify the party responsible for paying those taxes and taking care of any associated obligations.
The Middle Ground: This covenant requires the Seller to pay all taxes and fees incurred in connection with the transfer of the Purchased Assets (“transfer taxes”) when such taxes come due, and calls for the Buyer to reimburse the Seller for 50% of the taxed amount. It also requires the Seller to make any necessary filings in relation to transfer taxes, with the Buyer’s cooperation.
Purpose: This main function of this requirement is to ensure that someone pays the transfer taxes so that neither side has to deal with fines or other penalties resulting from one or both parties overlooking their tax obligations. The likelihood is that the Buyer and Seller will not even discuss it and will simply accept the local custom to determine who pays.
Buyer Preference: The Buyer wants the Seller to pay the transfer taxes, but will usually settle for either splitting the bill or allowing local custom to dictate the outcome.
Seller Preference: Similarly, the Seller wants this obligation to fall on the Buyer but will typically agree to a 50-50 split or to defer to local custom.
Differences in a Stock Sale Transaction Structure: None.
Receivables
What are Receivables? Acquisitions are a process, and even after the sale is closed it takes all those involved some time to adjust to their new circumstances. That includes customers, many of whom will continue to send their payments to the Seller (especially in business-to-business relationships). Also, customers are not aware of the specific deal terms, so they may send money to the Buyer that is actually owed to the Seller. Regardless of where the payments are initially sent, this covenant is aimed at making sure they end up where they’re supposed to be.
The Middle Ground: For any funds received by the Seller on or after the Closing Date that relate to the Purchased Assets, the Seller agrees to pass them along to the Buyer within a set number of days. Similarly, the Buyer agrees to send to the Seller any funds it receives that relate to the Excluded Assets within a similar time frame.
Purpose: The rights to the money mentioned here are established elsewhere in the Agreement, so the legal effect of this section is really to set a time frame for when that money must be turned over.
Buyer Preference: None.
Seller Preference: None.
Differences in a Stock Sale Transaction Structure: This clause need not be included in a Stock Purchase Agreement because there are no Purchased Assets or Excluded Assets. Everything, good or bad, goes to the Buyer after the Closing.
Bulk Sales Laws
What are Bulk Sales Laws? Bulk sales laws apply to transfers of significant assets that are not made in the ordinary course of business, and they generally require the Buyer to notify the Seller’s creditors of the acquisition prior to the Closing so the creditors can protect their interests.
The Middle Ground: The notification requirements associated with bulk sales laws can be burdensome, so typically the parties agree to waive compliance with those laws, and the Seller agrees to take responsibility for any Liabilities arising from the parties’ noncompliance.
Purpose: The provision plays a small role in limiting the Buyer’s transaction risk, but its main purpose is to speed up the acquisition process and limit transaction costs.
Buyer Preference: The Buyer wants to include the Seller’s explicit assumption of liabilities in this provision, as the default rule automatically transfers liability to the Buyer along with the transfer of assets. An aggressive Buyer may require indemnification for claims related to bulk sales laws rather than simply relying on the Seller’s covenant. Additionally, a Buyer may impose a requirement on the Seller to litigate any claims brought by creditors under the bulk sales laws. Alternatively, a more conservative Buyer might comply with bulk sales laws if it is not comfortable with the Seller’s level of debt or with a particular creditor.
Seller Preference: The Seller will likely seek to limit this provision to a waiver of compliance while remaining silent regarding the assumption of liability related to bulk sales. If the Seller does agree to assume that liability it might not object to granting the Buyer indemnification rights, but it will most likely resist any requirement to litigate claims brought by creditors. The Seller’s views on complying with bulk sales laws may depend on the transaction timeline (i.e. if compliance would delay the Closing), but the more decisive factor is likely to be how much additional work it creates for the Seller, who is already having to balance running the Business while simultaneously trying to sell it.
Differences in a Stock Sale Transaction Structure: This provision is not included in a stock sale because there is no transfer of assets between entities, the Buyer simply stands in the Seller’s shoes with regard to Business-creditor relationships.
Books and Records
What are Books and Records? Sometimes the Buyer needs access to pre-Closing information about the Business or the Seller needs similar post-Closing information. The need may arise because the two parties are in dispute and the relevant information is under the other side’s control, or it may result from a third-party claim or government inquiry (among other reasons). To address these situations ahead of time and in a fair manner, both sides agree on when access will be granted to the other’s books and records, and the length of time those records must be kept.
The Middle Ground: Here, both parties agree to keep copies of the Business’s pre-Closing Books and Records for a set period of time and to provide the other side with reasonable access to them. The parties may agree to provide access only under certain circumstances, such as if a claim is brought against either party in relation to the Business, or they can use a more general standard and allow access for any reasonable purpose. The amount of time the pre-transaction Books and Records are kept is typically based on the Seller’s past practices, and the other party is afforded access for an agreed-upon number of years. The right of access does not extend to situations in which granting such access would violate the law.
Purpose: This provision may never be utilized, but it is included nonetheless as a way to assist both sides in the event of a future claim (i.e. as a risk management tool). Memory is incredibly fallible and having to rely on it years down the road in the midst of a dispute is not a situation in which the Buyer or Seller wants to find itself. However, the risk being protected against is minute and each party is more likely to consult its own copies as opposed to those of the other side should the need arise (unless, perhaps, the claim is being brought by the other side). Thus, the provision does little more than provide a redundant fail-safe option that will likely never be used. That fact, in addition to the reciprocal nature of the covenant, means it will likely be included in the Agreement without any explicit discussion.
Buyer Preference: None.
Seller Preference: None.
Differences in a Stock Sale Transaction Structure: The only difference in this term in a stock sale is that the retention period for the Business’s Tax Records is based on statutory time limitations rather than the Seller’s past practices. Since the Buyer is assuming the tax liabilities of the Seller, it will want to retain those records for as long as a tax-related claim can be brought against the Business.
Governmental Approvals and Consents
What are Governmental Approvals and Consents? The lack of an important governmental approval or third-party consent can kill a deal despite the Buyer and Seller both wanting to move forward. To avoid that situation, the parties list out the necessary consents and approvals and split up the work in a way that makes sense for both sides. They also use this covenant to set boundaries around how far they must go in order to obtain a consent or approval.
The Middle Ground: This covenant requires both the Buyer and Seller to make all filings necessary to consummate the transaction, and to use their reasonable best efforts to obtain all the requisite consents from governmental authorities and third parties (e.g. customers and suppliers). It then lists out specific actions that the parties must carry out or avoid in order to obtain the necessary consents, such as litigating any order blocking the transaction, again modified by a reasonable best efforts standard. It also requires the parties to share certain information regarding communications with Governmental Authorities. Lastly, it expressly states that the Buyer is not required to sell off any part of its business or change the terms and conditions of the transaction to appease a Governmental Authority seeking to halt the transaction based on antitrust concerns.
Purpose: Once a potential deal reaches the exclusivity stage, it’s unlikely that a third party will prevent it from going through unless that third party is the government or has an important contract with the Seller and won’t consent to a change of control. This covenant seeks to deal with those two threats by allocating the serious risks they present between the parties.
Buyer Preference: The Buyer’s main concern with this clause is the application of the “reasonable best efforts” standard. The Buyer wants the standard included, but in defining what it means the Buyer needs to be aware of what it is willing (and unwilling) to do to close the transaction. For anything that it is unwilling to do, the Buyer will want an express statement to that effect included in the definition of reasonable best efforts. Given that the Seller will be the one that has the pre-existing relationships with important third parties other than the government, the Buyer generally wants the risk of not obtaining a third-party consent to fall on the Seller, with the risk of not obtaining Governmental Approval shared equally.
Seller Preference: The Seller wants to place the risk of not obtaining necessary Governmental Approvals on the Buyer, and it can do so by replacing the reasonable best efforts standard with a more demanding one. The Seller’s main concern is avoiding governmental interference with the deal, so it wants to place the burden relating to any such interference on the Buyer. The Seller can allocate that risk to the Buyer by requiring the Buyer to either divest assets to satisfy regulators or litigate any Governmental Order blocking the transaction. If the Buyer objects, the Seller can suggest putting caps on the amount of assets the Buyer must divest or that the parties list out specifically which assets would be subject to divestiture.
Differences in a Stock Sale Transaction Structure: None.
Equitable Remedies and Reasonableness of Restrictive Covenants
What is he Equitable Remedies and Reasonableness of Restrictive Covenants section? These two terms help enforce the three important restrictive covenants: the Confidentiality, Non-Compete and Non-Solicitation provisions. All of those restrictive covenants call for non-monetary (“equitable”) remedies, and the restrictions must be reasonable for a court to enforce them. By agreeing to this section, the Seller is agreeing that a non-monetary remedy is appropriate for the situation and that the specific restrictions included in the restrictive covenants are reasonable in the context of the transaction.
The Middle Ground: The Equitable Remedies provision states that a violation of any of the restrictive covenants would cause the Buyer irreparable harm for which money would not provide adequate compensation. It is meant to allow the Buyer to obtain an equitable remedy such as an injunction to prevent violations. The Reasonableness provision includes an acknowledgement from the Seller that the Confidentiality, Non-Compete and Non-Solicitation covenants are reasonable. It also states that if a court finds the restrictive covenants unreasonable, the Seller agrees that the court should reform the terms to the point where they are considered reasonable but still achieve the desired effect to the maximum extent allowed by law.
Purpose: These two provisions are aimed at protecting the viability of the restrictive covenants. The Confidentiality, Non-Compete and Non-Solicitation covenants do most of the heavy lifting in terms of protecting deal value, and these two covenants perform a smaller risk management function by ensuring that the more important covenants remain enforceable and effective.
Buyer Preference: Although there will typically be a specific performance clause applicable to the entire Agreement, the Buyer wants to include the Equitable Remedies covenant here so that there is no question that it applies to all restrictive covenants. The Buyer wants to be sure to include language that tracks the standard for granting injunctions and other equitable remedies (i.e. “irreparable harm…for which monetary damages would not be an adequate remedy”). In regard to the Reasonableness covenant, the ability to modify restrictive covenants rather than completely invalidating them is not available in all states. So, the Buyer’s counsel should adjust its approach depending on whether the law governing the agreement allows “blue-pencil” revisions. If not, the Buyer may want to include a choice of law clause or reduce the covenant restrictions so there is no doubt they are enforceable.
Seller Preference: If the Seller agrees that the restrictive are reasonable, it will likely have no objection to these two subsections since the entire purpose of both is to protect the viability of the restrictive covenants.
Differences in a Stock Sale Transaction Structure: None.
Confidentiality and Non-Disparagement
What is the Confidentiality and Non-Disparagement section? All businesses possess information that is beneficial to them because it is not known by the public (e.g. customer lists, trade secrets, etc.). Prior to the Closing, the Seller protects that information by requiring the Buyer to keep non-public information confidential. Post-Closing, the Buyer wants to place a similar confidentiality requirement on the Seller, and this covenant is used to accomplish that goal.
The Middle Ground: This covenant requires the Seller, its Affiliates, and its Representatives to use their reasonable best efforts post-Closing to keep confidential all information about the Business that is not otherwise publicly available. It also requires the Seller to take certain precautions if it is required by law to disclose the information, such as only providing information it is legally required to provide (as advised by legal counsel) and taking steps to limit who is able to access the confidential information that is disclosed. The parties also agree not to make negative or disparaging comments about each other to third parties.
Purpose: This covenant is intended to protect the value of the Business after the transfer of ownership has occurred by protecting the confidential information of the Business. For a serial buyer such as a private equity firm, it also protects future deals by preventing the Seller from providing potential future sellers with information about terms the Buyer is willing to accept and/or the Buyer’s negotiation strategies.
Buyer Preference: The Buyer wants to pay close attention to the definitions of Affiliates and Representatives to ensure that everyone who has access to the information sought to be protected has a duty of confidentiality with regard to that information. If the sale was initially conducted by auction, expansive definitions of Affiliates and Representatives may not adequately protect the Buyer’s risk, so the Buyer can have the Seller assign the confidentiality agreements signed by the other auction participants to protect the Business’s sensitive information. The Buyer also wants to be able to enforce this covenant using an injunction rather than indemnification, because preventing a violation is more valuable than receiving monetary compensation after one has occurred. To achieve that goal, the Buyer should explicitly carve out this covenant from the Exclusive Remedies provision.
Seller Preference: The Seller may want to include language indicating that the Buyer’s confidentiality obligations (often originating in the Letter of Intent) apply to information disclosed pursuant to the Agreement and that the Buyer’s confidentiality obligations survive termination of the Agreement. Essentially, such language provides protection for the Seller if the deal does not go through. The Seller will also pay attention to the scope of the disclosure restrictions so it can avoid being penalized for sharing information that doesn’t have the potential to hurt the Business or the Buyer.
Differences in a Stock Sale Transaction Structure: None.